Dupont, Schultz, & Angin: Political Risk and Investment Arbitration: An Empirical Study

Cedric G. Dupont (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies), Thomas Schultz (King's College London – Law), & Merih Angin (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies) have posted Political Risk and Investment Arbitration: An Empirical Study (Journal of International Dispute Settlement, forthcoming). Here's the abstract:

Investment arbitrations should not happen too often, because they are costly processes for both parties. Yet they regularly happen. Why? We investigate the hypothesis that investment arbitrations are used as a means of last resort, after dissuasion has failed, and that dissuasion is most likely to fail in situations were significant political risk materializes. Investment arbitration should thus tend to target countries in which certain types of political risk has materialized. In order to test this hypothesis, we focus in this paper on two drivers of political risk: bad governance, and economic crises. We test various links between those two drivers of risk and arbitration claims. We use an original dataset that includes investment claims filed under the rules of all arbitration institutions as well as ad hoc arbitrations. We find that bad governance, understood as corruption and lack of rule of law (using the WGI Corruption and WGI Rule of Law indexes), has a statistically significant relation with investment arbitration claims, but economic crises do not.